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DO MY RIGHTS GET IN THE WAY OF MY FREEDOM?
AN EXAMINATION OF THE ROLE OF RIGHTS IN A
SOCIETY OF EMPOWERED PEOPLE
JOHN H. MORRIS, JR.*
Freedom is a complicated thing. We live in a society in which
freedom is the prevailing value. I am, therefore, free to do as I choose.
At least, that is what each of us wants to believe in a free society.
However, I also live in the world with you. My freedom sometimes
gets in the way of your freedom. How then can we both be free?
In this world of other people, what does it mean to be free? Is
our freedom no more than the power each of us has to step on the toes
of anyone who gets in the way of our freedom without any restricting
objection? Or, is our freedom in this free society simply the extent to
which my freedom and your freedom can coexist?
How then do we manage this coexistence and maintain the
facade of freedom? Can it be that in such coexistence neither of us is
truly free? Or, is such coexistence the only freedom we can know in a
world we share with other people? Such is the social dilemma of
freedom in a world with people other than me.
This paper is a thought experiment in the meaning of freedom
in a society of free people. Our conception of freedom is personal,
and, indeed, it may be meaningful only in a personal sense. I am free.
We are free only as individuals who may separately know freedom
together.
The idea that "we" can know freedom "collectively" is
problematic for us in the absence of a collective consciousness through
which we can thus comprehend our collective freedom. In this sense,
the Borg civilization portrayed in the Star Trek series, for example,
embodies such a collective consciousness in which my experience is
your experience, and our freedom necessarily transcends the
aggregation of your and my individual liberty. Whether we want such
a civilization is yet another question. However, my consciousness,
and that of everyone else I know on this planet, is separate and unique.
* John H. Morris, Jr., Esq is a writier and lecturer. Mr. Morris is the major contributing
author and a co-editor of CLAIRVOYANCE: REVIEWING THE FABRIC OF COMMUNITY FOR BLACK
FOLK (John H. Morris, Jr. & Charles G. Tildon, Jr. eds., 1998). This article is based on a
presentation given on March 4, 2000 at MARGINS' inaugural symposium entitled Individual
Rights v, Community Voice.
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Inevitably, freedom, as we are constituted to know it, can only be
personal.
From this strange vantage we approach the question of
individual freedom and group interests. As we often speak of them,
the rights of individuals and the interests of groups are
characteristically at odds. For instance, some people argue that
individuals have rights, and groups do not.' We may be inclined to see
a collective focus as constricting individual autonomy. The question
we thus probe is how we make sense of this concept of freedom that
views each of us as autonomous beings within a social context of other
equally autonomous beings.
I. THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM IN A WORLD OF PEOPLE
Other people necessarily complicate our personal pursuit of
freedom. In a world in which I coexist with others, my freedom can
intrude upon that of another and his or her freedom can constrict mine.
Rights arise as one way of sorting out our bumping together as we
pursue our individual paths to freedom and happiness.
"Rights" require authority and thereby imply hierarchy. Rights
work by conferring on certain people the authority to pursue their
freedom and implicitly create a hierarchy in which, in a given area,
their sensibility can take precedence over that of anyone else whether
or not they are agreeable. "Rights" therefore invariably create and
invite conflicts. As such, rights require institutions, such as
governments and courts, to resolve the conflicts.
Freedom exists within such a society through the idea of
"rights." Through "rights," we create competing interests and a
structure to reconcile them; this structure appears to allow for
individual autonomy to exist within a society of otherwise autonomous
individuals. These "rights" also dictate certain relationships between
people in order to protect their freedom.
What if we created a vehicle other than "rights" to enable free
people to coexist? That solution would require us to reinverit the
world in which such freedom exists. Consider these changes in
conditions:
1. See ETHNICITY AND GRouP RIGHTS (Ian Shapiro & Will Kymlicka eds., New York
University Press 1997).
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The vehicle that supports our freedom does not require
authority, hierarchy, or competing interests.
The vehicle secures coexistence through agreement,
negotiation, and cooperation.
If we change these fundamental conditions, are "individual
rights" and "community rights" necessarily opposed? The result here
may be there are no rights, only the freedom to create such space as
others may agree within which we exercise our freedom. How would
such a world work?
The Case of John Rocker
Here is the problem. John Rocker, the famous baseball relief
pitcher, has opinions. As a famous athlete, he also has a forum to
express them. A national sports magazine publishes his opinions.2 In
the national publication, the baseball pitcher rails against children,
Asian women drivers, foreigners, homosexuals, an African American
teammate he calls "a fat monkey," and Latrell Sprewell, an African
American basketball player who choked his coach. The pitcher
believes Sprewell should have been arrested and would have been
arrested had he been white.
3
Hank Aaron, a revered baseball icon, is an executive with the
pitcher's baseball team.4 He happens to be an African American who,
as a player, achieved baseball immortality in face of similar comments
directed his way.5 Having suffered in silence when he had no choice
2. Jeff Pearlman, At Full Blast, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, December 27, 1999, at 60
(available online) <http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/features/cover/news/I 999/12/22/rocker/
index.html> (infamous interview with John Rocker).
3. Id.
4. Murray Chass, Remarks Could Hurt Rocker Most ofAll, N.Y. TMES, December 24,
1999, at DI. Hank Aaron, a Hall-of-Famer and senior vice president with the Atlanta Braves,
was "sickened by Rocker's remarks and questioned how he could remain in baseball, not just
with the Braves." Id.
5. Vahe Gregorian, Hank Aaron: Home Run King Transforms Acrimony Into Desire to
Educate, ST. LOuiS POST-DISPATCH, February 25, 2001, at DI0. "Whatever enlightenment
was forged by the tumultuous times of the 1960s, little appeared different in 1974 when
Aaron, playing for the Atlanta Braves, was zeroing in on Babe Ruth's mark of 714 homers.
Death threats became a routine, and many of the 930,000 pieces of mail he received during a
two-year period were vile, if not hostile. Ultimately, he required a 24-hour bodyguard, and for
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and no voice, Aaron now decides to weigh in against this personal
embarrassment to himself, both as an African American man and as an
executive with the organization that employs the offending pitcher. 6
He says he wants the pitcher canned.
7
Members of the various groups that were the subject of the
pitcher's remarks are not amused by them. They are offended. They
are angry. They are anxious to know what happens next.8 Are they
expected to forgive and forget? Or, will someone acknowledge their
offense by doing something to the pitcher?
There are also people who are less offended by what the
pitcher had to say than the idea that anyone would silence him just for
saying it. They wait to challenge any attempt to stifle expression-
even this hostile expression by the baseball pitcher.
9
Then there are the other baseball executives for this team, as
well as those of other baseball teams. What are they to do? Affirm the
pitcher's freedom of expression and convey insult to a significant
number of past and present players and paying customers offended by
what the pitcher had to say? Or, do they take punitive action against
the pitcher and invite the cynicism of people who remember when
both the team and the game protected other players who had publicly
offered such comments?
How then does this problem of the pitcher's freedom get
resolved? He has offended or alienated a substantial number of
baseball fans, fans who may refuse to contribute to his livelihood and
the celebrity that allows him to insult them so publicly by choosing not
to spend their entertainment dollars at the ballpark to watch this man
pitch. 0 Let's say that these people and those who support them just
want to see the pitcher pay some price for the way he has chosen to
speak his mind. Let's say further that they begin to talk about not
attending the games where the pitcher is to appear. It then rests with
the powers that be in baseball to bring the peace that keep the baseball
safety, he stayed at undisclosed locations apart from his teammates. He was kept away from
his family often. And his daughter, a college student, needed protection." Id.
6. Chass, supra note 4.
7. Id.
8. Doug Payne, Civil Rights Leaders Differ on Rocker Suspension, THE ATLANTA
JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, February 1, 2000, at 5E. See also Claire Smith, John Rocker Is a
Public Menace, THE PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, December 24, 1999.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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dollars flowing. In that accommodation of interests, where is the
freedom?
Here is the deal that the lords of baseball strike with our
baseball pitcher exercising his freedom. They suspend him
unceremoniously from the sport for period that keeps him from spring
training and some time into the beginning of the season.'1 Our pitcher
appeals this decision and by arbitrated resolution, his suspension is
shortened to allow him to open the baseball season.
12
As it turns out, when our pitcher starts his season he is not at
the top of his game. For a time, he is sent down to the minor
leagues. 13 However, to meet the pitching needs of his team, he soon
returns to the major league. 14  He apologizes to his team and his
teammates.1 5 He puts on a new public face of contrition and assumes a
lower public profile.' 6 His team's baseball icon accepts what appears
to be a new leaf for the pitcher. 17 All is well with the world. Or is it?
There lies our predicament with this thing that passes as
freedom. Is this state of affairs satisfying, and, if so, to whom?
Our pitcher has had his say and still gets to pitch. He has had
to eat a little crow, with public apologies and a promise for greater
care in his public exchanges. The team gets its prize player to help it
pursue a world championship. The lords of baseball still have people
paying to come to the ballpark to see the game and the pitcher. But
what of the others in our strange morality play? What about the
baseball icon and the people our pitcher insulted or even those people
troubled by the restraint imposed on the pitcher just for stating his
view?
The baseball icon says that he is fine with this solution. 18 He
has exercised his freedom to be both critical initially and
11. Ross Newhan, Now, Baseball Has Spoken, Los ANGELES TIMEs, February 1, 2000,
at Dl.
12. Richard Wilner, Rocker Files for Day in Court, N.Y. POST, February 2, 2000, at 67.
13. Thomas Stinson, Rocker Gets a Timeout in AAA, THE ATLANTA JOURNAL-
CONSTITUTION, June 6, 2000, at IF.
14. Thomas Stinson, Braves Bring Back Rocker, THE ATLANTA-JOURNAL
CONSTITUTION, June 14, 2000, at IA.
15. Carroll Rodgers, A Day of Healing for Rocker: Meeting, Apologies Clear Air on
Return, THE ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, March 3, 2000, at IC.
16. Id.
17. Thomas Stinson, Braves Soften: Aaron Suggests Rocker's 'Lucky,' THE ATLANTA-
JOURNAL CONSTITUTION, February 1, 2000, at 5E. See also Ross Newhan, Now, Baseball Has
Spoken, LOS ANGELES TIMES, February 1, 2000, at D1.
18. Id.
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magnanimous in the end. Whether he would feel the same way if the
pitcher returns to offer the same distressing views again is less certain.
The people who were insulted will do what they can. Those
who like baseball and can go to the ballpark will exercise their
freedom to shout harsh things at the pitcher. The others may just
express their opposition in letters to publications or nasty notes to the
pitcher. The people who harbor reverence for the pitcher's right to
offend will note the injustice of the pitcher's suspension and eagerly
await the next time the pitcher will test the resolve of the people who
run his sport.
In many ways, we find our freedom somewhere between the
rock and the hard place where the baseball executives found
themselves. We say we believe in the freedom to express ourselves as
we would choose. We also say that we should be free from the
gratuitous insult that sometimes arises from unrestricted expression.
But what then are we to do when the freedom to choose necessarily
allows for the choice that harms? If we do not have the freedom to
protect ourselves from the harm that freedom brings, is there any
freedom at all for us? Or does freedom merely become the power of
those who would be free and the acceptance of those without power,
who have no other choice? Thus, is our freedom more than the
illusion that power permits? Can I therefore have freedom without the
power to protect my own freedom?
II. THE ILLUSION OF FREEDOM AND THE THEORY OF RIGHTS
We understand freedom in terms of rights or at least through
the concept of rights. When we think about freedom in America, our
thoughts may go to the Bill of Rights, or civil rights, or children's
rights, or workers' rights, but always to rights. How then does a right
assure freedom?
We begin by assuring the right to do something. For example,
in keeping with our scenario involving the baseball pitcher, you say
that I have the right to speak my mind. Does that mean that I am not
free to speak my mind without the right? Of course not. Unless
someone else restrains me, I am free to say whatever I want. The right
suggests only that no one else will restrain me if I choose to speak my
mind.
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But who says that no one else will restrain me? That much is
not altogether clear. Sometimes we mean the government. Other
times we mean to say that, as a body of people, all of us or at least
enough of us will see to it that no one else will restrain me if I choose
to speak my mind.
Now, what happens if, in choosing to speak my mind, I happen
to insult, offend, endanger, or frighten enough people who would
otherwise protect me from those who would restrain me from
speaking? So much then for my right to speak my mind? Not
necessarily. Here, we say that it is the role of governments and
constitutions to protect unpopular minorities.
But what is the jurisdiction of government? The First
Amendment assures us only that government will not restrain us in
how we choose to speak our mind. It says nothing about what our
neighbors may choose to do when we choose to speak our mind.
III. AN ANALYSIS OF RIGHTS
A. A Perspective from Historical Myth
Let us begin with the observation that the idea of rights is a
relatively new invention. The Magna Charta is not quite 800 years
old.' 9 The United States Constitution is in its relative infancy at 210.20
Whatever we derive from the U.N. Charter, we have done so for no
more than fifty-five years.21 This is just to highlight the obvious point
that the idea of freedom has existed for some time without the notion
of rights. How then did free people who existed before our
preoccupation with rights conceive their freedom?
If I lived in ancient Athens or in some small provincial town in
the Roman Empire, my preoccupation with being free likely revolved
around whether I was a slave.22 Freedom for me would correlate with
19. Louis HENKIN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS 16 (1999).
20. U.S. CONST.
21. See Louis HENKrN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS 306 (1999). The U.N. Charter
"established that human rights were a matter of legitimate and appropriate international
concern, and declared it to be the purpose of the United Nations to promote universal respect
and observance of human rights." Id.
22. See RUDOLPH SoHM, THE INSTITUTES: A TEXTBOOK OF THE HISTORY AND SYSTEM OF
ROMAN PRIVATE LAW (James Crawford Ledlie, trans., 3rd ed. 1940).
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(1) my capacity to buy and own other people for their labor, (2) my
family and their social status, and (3) my political connections with the
authorities and those of my relatives and friends.23 To the extent that
my life's circumstances fell favorably within these conditions, I
enjoyed a capacity to choose for myself my own life's outcomes and
understood how my personal choices and those of others fit together in
some understood harmony.
24
Within the Western European tradition as it developed after the
fall of Rome, freedom remained that province beyond ownership by
someone else and reliance upon someone else for physical protection
and the roof over one's head.25 Within these conditions, the abstract
idea of freedom was little more than the notion of royal prerogatives.
Freedom was living the life of a king-as long as it fit within a
hierarchy of relationships that allowed us to lord our personal will over
others.
26
In this world, those who were not the king enjoyed freedom
together within a social hierarchy that defined both our lives and our
freedom. 27 If I was a slave, a bondsman, or a serf, I had no freedom at
all to speak of.28 As a freeman without family status, wealth, property,
or political ties, my freedom existed as my priority to act relative to
those beneath me-slaves, bondsmen, and serfs. Up that social
hierarchy, freedom is the presumption to intrude on those below.
Thus, the only person with complete freedom within this framework is
the person at the top of the hierarchy-the sovereign. Even here, there
are complications. With Runnymede and the Magna Charta, power,
powerlessness, and necessity gave rise to the articulation of rights.
In 1215, King John found himself having trouble sustaining his
power.30 The English feudal barons, who provided both the money
and the arms that propped the English throne, took advantage of his
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See generally Jonathan A. Bush, The First Slave (and Why He Matters), 18
CARDOZO L. REv. 599 (1996); William M. Wiecek, The Origins of the Law of Slavery in
British North America, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1711 (1996).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. The Magna Carta: The Reasons for its Granting, The Columbia Electronic
Encyclopedia 1994 (visited March 8, 2001) <http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/history/
A0859418.html>.
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predicament to do a little "collective bargaining.",31 The result was a
document that guaranteed that the king could not encroach the
prerogatives of his nobles.32  By its terms, among others, King John
granted "to all free men of our kingdom... for us and our heirs for
ever, all the liberties written out below, to have and to keep for them
and their heirs, of us and our heirs."33 What are these "liberties ... to
have and to keep?" From where did they come? How do you enforce
them? How do you invoke this right to the benefit of your freedom?
Before we accept the charter, without qualification, as a
document affirming the rights of man-or at least the rights of
Englishmen-we should reflect on a few things the document did and
did not do. Among other things, it affirmed the inheritance privileges
of the barons.34 It also declared the debts of Jews to barons to be free
of interest, in the event the debtor died while the debtor's heir was
underage. 35 Apparently, the charter was not drafted to protect fully the
interests of Jewish moneylenders, none of whom was likely present or
represented during negotiation with the king.36  We might also
consider that the very first paragraph of the document is confirmation
by the king "for us and our heirs in perpetuity, that the English Church
shall be free, and shall have its rights undiminished, and its liberties
unimpaired., 37  Within the context of this particular negotiation,
"perpetuity" lasted about 319 years, until Henry VIII, by the Act of
31. Id.
32. F.E. HALLIDAY, A CONCISE HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM STONEHENGE TO THE
MICROCHIP 51-53 (1989).
33. MAGNA CARTA, in Louis B. WRIGHT, MAGNA CARTA AND THE TRADITION OF
LIBERTY 54, 54 (G.R.C. David, trans., the United States Capitol Historical Society and the
Supreme Court Historical Society 1976).
34. Id. The relevant translated text reads as follows: "If any earl, baron, or other person
that holds lands directly of the Crown, for military service, shall die, and at his death his heir
shall be of full age and owe a 'relief,' the heir shall have his inheritance on payment of the
ancient scale of 'relief.' That is to say, the heir or heirs of an earl shall pay £100 for the entire
earl's barony, the heir or heirs of a knight 100s. at most for the entire knight's 'fee,' and any
man that owes less shall pay less, in accordance with the ancient usage of fees." Id.
35. Id. at 55. The relevant translated text reads as follows: "If anyone who has
borrowed a sum of money from Jews dies before the debt has been repaid, his heir shall pay
no interest on the debt for so long as he remains under age, irrespective of whom he holds his
lands. If such a debt falls into the hands of the crown, it will take nothing except the principal
sum specified in the bond." Id.
36. See Jonathan A. Bush, "You're Gonna Miss Me When I Am Gone": Early Modern
Common Law Discourse and the Case of the Jews, 1993 Wis. L. REv. 1225 (1993).
37. MAGNA CARTA, supra note 33, at 54.
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Supremacy in 1534, made himself protector of the faith to secure a
divorce from Catherine of Aragon.
38
Rights are drafted in a language that speaks of principles and
absolutes. We put these words on papers we revere and treasure. Yet,
the meaning of the words invariably shift to fit the prevailing interests
of the moment. This observation that rights are ephemeral and fluid is
neither novel nor remarkable. The point is just to remember that rights
are always a vehicle for protecting interests, and that interests join
individuals to groups.
B. Strategies for Personal Autonomy
History also provides evidence of how people seeking
autonomy in a world of other people have found liberty without resort
to "rights" as their principal vehicle. These other "strategies for
personal autonomy" might be described as follows: (1) flight; (2)
bargaining; and (3) political organizing.
1. Flight to Freedom
If I tell you that your freedom gets in my way, you might be
concerned depending on how much power you concede to me. If your
three-year old child offers this sentiment, you find the thought
endearing and not at all threatening. You hold the power in that
relationship. On the other hand, if Adolph Hitler were to express the
same sentiment and you happened to live in Nazi Germany during the
1930s, you most likely would experience some apprehension. Most
likely, you would fear for your personal safety and your personal
freedom.
Your response to such a challenge would be to flee beyond the
reach of anyone who could limit your freedom. You would employ
flight as a strategy to secure and protect your autonomy.
Flight is a long practiced strategy for freedom. Young men of
times past went off to strange lands for the freedom of adventure they
could never know where they grew up. If they lived in medieval
Europe, they might join the crusades in the Holy Lands or go off to
sea. In later times, freedom was assured by flight to the New World,
to European colonies in Africa, South America, or Asia, or, on the
38. Henry VIII, King of England: Reign, The Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia 1994
(visited March 8, 2001) <http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/people/A0858608.html>.
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North American continent, to the western frontier. If you happened to
be of African descent in the southern United States, freedom meant
either escape or migration to the north. In future times, freedom might
be embodied by travel to outer space. At the moment, freedom resides
in cyberspace.
As a strategy for autonomy, flight has its limitations. At best,
it is a short-term solution. Over time, flight invariably offers
diminishing returns to those who resort to it. Other people quickly
find you and ruin the freedom of isolation. Either the attraction of the
paradise that promises freedom is too great, or the isolation we thought
we found is an illusion. We are the newcomer for those others who
found paradise first-people who get in the way of our freedom. What
is a person to do?
2. Bargaining: Living to Let Live
For the short span between the time that you discover paradise
and the rest of the world discovers it too, you exist together with those
who have arrived in paradise before you by making order of its
wondrous chaos. You survive to enjoy your relative isolation by
striking a deal with them to live and let live. You leave them alone.
They leave you alone.
We can only imagine now how the so-called "Mountain men"
of the American westward expansion lived with the various nations
and tribes that populated the land beyond the early frontier. We can
only imagine the understanding they reached for their own survival
about how much game to hunt for their own sustenance, what places
and paths they were free to traverse, and with which peoples it was
safe for them to consort. We can only imagine that they would explain
that by living within the terms of these compacts they found peace and
harmony with their environment. In that peace and harmony, there
was freedom.
Still, this strategy had its limitations. Inevitably, people from
the outside arrived who did not know the terms of the fragile
accommodation. These new arrivals disrupted life for everyone. They
created conflicts where there had been none. Their numbers
introduced a different kind of chaos-social chaos of numerous people
too absorbed in their own affairs to engage anyone else in a bargained
existence. Their unawareness of anyone else required organization
and rules to regulate conflict.
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3. Political Organizing: Making Peace By Aligning Power
In this world of free-wheeling self interest, political organizing
is necessary both for life and freedom. Such a world presumes
conflict. In a world teeming with people pursuing personal agendas,
we expect that there will be some toes stepped on and more than a few
fistfights. The principal question for preserving the peace is what
keeps people from stepping on toes or throwing a punch?
In order to counter established power that would give any one
of us the freedom to step on someone else's toes or to punch another
person, we create rules and align power against anyone who would
transgress our rules. By aligning the power of the rest of us, we make
rules work. To change the rules, we then have to realign power by
political organizing. It is through rules then that political organizing
assures freedom. These rules are the "rights" we speak of.
In the first half of the twentieth century, the movement that
resulted in the social and political emergence of African Americans
illustrates the strategy of political organizing. The movement's arsenal
consisted of court litigation and political action through street
demonstrations, marches, voter registration, and the more formal
support of selected politicians. 39 The movement's vehicle for securing
freedom consisted of court decisions construing law and the legislation
creating it.
As a strategy, political organizing too has its limitations. Its
success breeds complacency in the apparent permanence of judicial
holdings and enacted laws. Once its objectives have been secured in
the form of a given decision or legislative enactment, the mobilizing of
power to secure the outcome generally loses momentum. We stop
organizing and mobilizing. We expect the laws and the rights to
enforce themselves.
C. Reflections on Freedom, Autonomy, and Power
So goes this analysis of strategies for freedom in a world of
people. We proceed from fleeing to an unknown world without
39. See William E. Forbath, Civil Rights and Economic Citizenship: Notes on the Past
and Future of the Civil Rights and Labor Movements, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 697 (2000);
STEPHEN F. LAWSON, RUNNING FOR FREEDOM: CIVIL RIGHTS AND BLACK POLITICS IN AMERICA
SINCE 1941 (1990).
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people, to bargaining with a limited number of people we encounter, to
organizing when the incursion of our fellow beings in our free space
becomes too great. Still, we pursue freedom in a changing dynamic
that always seems to defeat our urge to be free. Once we find the
unknown land without people, we either find other people or they find
us. Seeking an uneasy peace, we try to negotiate, but others arrive
who do not abide by the terms of our deal. We seek to protect
ourselves by political alliances. However, power does not gently
reconcile difference. It roughly dismisses it and forces us to abide by
the accommodation it dictates. Should we still desire to resist in the
autonomy we want for ourselves, we can always flee beyond the next
frontier to start the process all over again. The inevitable result of this
ongoing process is that a satisfying freedom is an elusive outcome.
Even with this panoply of rights, at least in our language and
thinking, we still fail to find a freedom that we can sustain to our
satisfaction. Perhaps the problem is not in the administration of this
framework of rights, but in the idea itself. Perhaps we have reached
the limits of what the theory of rights can do for us.
IV. THE PROBLEM WITH RIGHTS: WHAT DO THE POWERFUL NEED
RIGHTS FOR?
Within our strategy of securing freedom by political
organizing, rights are just another kind of rule we prescribe for
ourselves to regulate autonomy within a large population. However,
as we use this rulemaking authority, rights raise a curious question.
Do powerful people use rights or invoke them to secure their freedom?
Or, do only the impotent use rights this way?
Think about it. When was the last time you saw a march on
Wall Street to assert the rights of the well-heeled or the well-born to
preferential treatment? We live in a society that touts the rule of law
as applicable to all. So, you would think that everyone would benefit
the same from all aspects of the law, including its framework of rights.
Yet, as ridiculous as this march on Wall Street seems given our
experience, it would appear that the powerful do not rely upon rights
as the source of their freedom as would people without power. In our
language of freedom, we might say that the powerful exercise
"prerogatives." A prerogative is just a convention by which the rest of
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us tolerate, without questioning, the exercise of power by those who
already possess it. We might then ask ourselves, how then is a "ight"
different from a "prerogative?"
Within this context, we might say that a "right" is a convention
by which the rest of us accord power to a person or a group of people
to do something. I speak my mind on the street comer challenging
governmental policy or I wear openly an emblem of my religious faith.
What I say or wear provokes others who may take offense. However,
by this convention, enough people close ranks around me, not to agree
with what I am doing, but to protect my ability to do so. Without
them, I could not succeed in my assertion of power. But, if I could out
of the fear I generated or the desire of people to ingratiate themselves
with me I would be asserting a prerogative, not a right. The difference
then between what we call my prerogative and my right is the power I
have to do what I want to do in one case and my lack of power in the
other case.
Do rights then require powerlessness to have meaning? If only
the dispossessed rely upon them and the powerful give them little
consideration, does the exercise of a right pose a dilemma? If I am to
assert a "right" do I also concede my impotence to act without the
right? In so doing, our reliance upon a framework of rights makes all
of us like Blanche Dubois in "A Streetcar Named Desire"--always
dependent "on the kindness of strangers. 4 °
There is an underlying impotence about our reliance upon
rights that is troubling. It begs uncomfortable questions about
disparities of power in the world and our willingness not only to
tolerate them but to order our reality around them. If rights necessarily
imply impotence, it might also be that powerlessness requires this
framework of rights. In a strange irony, this framework of freedom
may also form the foundation of our own imprisonment.
40. TENNESSEE WILLIAMS, A STREETCAR NAMED DESIRE SC. 11 (Penguin Books 1947).
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V. A WORLD OF FREEDOM WITHOUT RIGHTS
I ask these questions less to make a profound statement about
the limitations of rights than to give some hint as to what the
alternative might be. Compare the world that needs rights with a
world that manages to secure freedom without them. My premise here
is that what ultimately secures freedom is our readiness and
willingness to exercise it. Whatever may cause us to forebear makes
us less free.
A world of freedom therefore is populated by people who
choose to exercise their free will. In such a world, rights help us
resolve who gets to assert his or her freedom when free people get in
the way of one another. This world of freedom without rights
therefore must find a way to resolve the conflicts that freedom
necessarily creates in a world populated with free people.
As we recalled the strategy of bargaining in our historical
observations, we resolved conflict through negotiation. In the world of
bargaining, free people chose to live and let live in exercising their
freedom. Forbearance, in that world, while a matter of choice, was a
choice made by the participants, not the powerful. That world,
however, broke down when others arrived to upset the power
equilibrium by adding participants who were not interested in
bargaining.
The result, as noted in our observations, was the emergence of
a need for rules. If we are to avoid the need for rules to resolve
freedom conflicts, what would have to happen in the world? Consider
these options as a beginning:
" People who define their own interests
without reference to the interests of other
people-I do not define what I want by
looking at what you have;
" People who exercise their freedom to
secure the interests that they define;
" An understanding shared by people of
what each brings to support the interests
of the others;
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A collective presence capable of
mediating differences by aligning
resources that promote a free exchange
between interested individuals.
Under the above conditions, within a framework of bargaining,
people create an arrangement where they can exercise their will to the
extent they are able to maintain the peace by meeting the interests of
the other participants. As long as they succeed in addressing the
respective interests of the other participants to allow all to live and let
live, freedom sustains itself through the power that each participant
wields to address his or her own interests. In this way, the participants
maintain their own freedom through their own power to resolve the
conflicts that may get in the way of their freedom. They have no need
to cede their power to address their interests by relying upon a third
party to enforce rules that protect them from the encroachments of
others.
Rather than consider the problem abstractly, let us return to our
earlier scenario of John Rocker to replay that set of facts within a
bargaining world. Everything remains the same, except the way we
think about freedom.
Rethinking the Case of John Rocker
As earlier noted, the famous relief pitcher has expressed his
opinion to the chagrin of some, the embarrassment of others, and the
enjoyment of still others. The lords of baseball are concerned. The
baseball icon from the pitcher's team is offended. Within the conflict
of concerns, apparently conflicting freedoms play out.
Our earlier scenario presented conflicting principles whose
implications reflected on the freedom of our various participants
differently. Generally, the conflict was as follows: the right of people
in a free society to speak their minds versus the right of people in a
decent society not to be diminished just because of who they are-in
other words, the freedom to be oneself. Under the rules of this
framework, the freedom of our relief pitcher was assured by the first
principle, while the sensibilities of the people of whom he spoke were
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protected by the second. The problem was how to resolve the
dilemma presented by this scenario in which these principles conflict.
Inevitably, the resolution remains troubling when we approach
the scenario on the basis of rules and principles. How do we resolve a
conflict of principles in a principled way? Generally we cannot. One
principle must give way to the other in a way that undermines its
existence as a controlling principle. One principle must be
compromised, and principles generally do not satisfy us when
compromised. Their appeal is to express values that have universal
application unrelated to the personalities involved.
The world of bargaining, however, is not driven by principle.
It is shaped by interests. Within this framework, we are not looking
for a principle to resolve the conflict. We are just looking for an
exchange that evenly addresses the respective interests of the parties in
conflict.
In our baseball scenario, the interests are as follows:
" Our relief pitcher wants to continue
pitching in the big leagues and to
continue speaking his mind as he sees
fit.
" The subjects of his outbursts want to
escape gratuitous insult for being who
they are.
" The revered baseball icon wants respect
from the game for being who he is and
the power to deal with the kind of insults
the pitcher offered and that he had to
endure earlier in his career.
" The principled libertarian fans want to
see our pitcher perform, free to speak his
mind.
" The principled egalitarian fans want to
see our pitcher sanctioned to preserve
the egalitarian fabric of the sport.
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* The lords of baseball want people to
keep coming to ball games and paying
the freight.
Within the framework of bargaining, there is a possible deal to
be struck that promotes the interests and the freedom of the various
participants. Under this deal, we say that our relief pitcher may
continue to pitch and speak his mind, but that the rest of us are also
free to revile him for what he says, hound him whenever he performs,
and offer our own response not to pay to watch him pitch. As a result
of the pitcher's decision to exercise his freedom, he may increase or
decrease his popularity, and his popularity may affect his income.
However, that is the risk his exercise of freedom entails.
To those looking for someone else to exact a toll on the pitcher
on their behalf, we say that it is their freedom to do so, but it is not our
responsibility. Be free to express yourself. Perhaps the lords of
baseball, in their own interest, make an effort to create a forum for
these fans to express themselves, maybe through a web site devoted to
views about the pitcher and his comments or by designating a special
night at the ballpark for free expression.41 The revered icon has also
made his peace. He has had his say with the pitcher, which was more
than he was ever afforded in dealing with the anonymous fans who
harassed him during his quest for baseball immortality.
This self-conscious accommodation of interests avoids the
inherent dishonesty of dealing in uncompromising principles we are
inevitably compelled to compromise. Instead, we acknowledge the
power that each of us has to act in defense of our own interests by our
freedom to act. As we then choose more frequently to act in our
freedom than to forbear, we enrich the freedom within our world.
However, the world in which such bargaining pervades is potentially
more rancorous than the world where rules and principles shape public
behavior.
41. In the case of basketball star Allen Iverson's allegedly offensive rap lyrics,
basketball commissioner David Stem's response similarly acknowledged everyone's liberty
interest in the situation by declining to impose discipline on the ballplayer while noting the
freedom of everyone else not to buy the album and to express, with him, their shared revulsion
for the lyrics in question. Ashley McGeachy, Stern Meets with Iverson Over Gangsta Music,
Says Lyrics Will Be Changed, THE PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, October 16, 2000; Jeff Pearlman,
"It's About Time," SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, November 13, 2000, at 44.
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VI. INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS IN THIS BARGAINED-FOR FREEDOM
Framing the issue as a potential conflict between "individual
rights" and "community rights" necessarily focuses on whether these
two concepts are dichotomous. The question as posed necessarily
assumes a framework of rights. As rights may work in our use of
language the notion of a community right may be as problematic as a
notion of collective consciousness to share the experience of freedom.
However, from the perspective of interests, there is no
conceptual discrepancy created by thinking about interests in an
individual or a community context. Indeed, individuals can possess
interests, and when many individuals share a community of interests
they look and function like what our language calls a community.
Accordingly, not only can both individuals and communities possess
interests, they can possess the same interests.
The premise of this paper is that our understanding of freedom
is not confined to an understanding of rights. It also can embrace an
understanding of interests. This conception of freedom allows
communities to have an important role in helping us define, promote,
and protect interests. Ultimately, a community enhances the capacity
of the individual to bargain his interests to promote his freedom.

